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"To evaluate or not to evaluate;" for many mediation scholars and
practitioners, "that is the question."' Of the numerous controversies
surrounding mediation today, none has generated quite as much heat as
the propriety of mediator evaluation While some mediators stead-
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formed yeoman service, as did the Thomas Jefferson School of Law library staff. My thanks
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1. Marjorie Corman Aaron, A Mediator's Soliloquy, in 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE
HIGH COST OF LITIG. 63 (1996); With apologies to Shakespeare, Ms. Aaron writes:
To evaluate or not to evaluate: that is the question.
Whether 'tis wiser to let all hope of settlement sink,
Or to neutrally evaluate and change what the parties think,
Mediators who evaluate must be very cautious,
For it can alienate the parties and to the process be noxious.
Evaluation can turn them away and spur a court fight
To the detriment of all, no matter who is right.
On the other hand, evaluation can save the day,
Enlightening the partisan to what lies in the way.
Mediator evaluation can be a weapon of great might,
But it should be used last and it must be done right.
But see L. Randolph Lowry, To Evaluate or Not-That is Not the Question! RESOLUTIONS
(Strauss Institute For Disp. Resol. Pepp. U. Sch. of L.), Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter 1997) (arguing
that evaluative mediation is endorsed, embraced, and selected by many mediation clients and
that determining how and when to evaluate remains the real question).
2. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of its Own:
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1887 (1997) ("The current,
most heated debate concerns the question whether mediation is facilitative or evaluative or
both."); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing
the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 986 (1997) ("If the debate were simply a ter-
minological quibble about the use of a particular term, "mediation," then people would
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fastly avoid expressing any opinion about the strength or viability of a
disputant's position, others incorporate such judgments into their stan-
dard arsenal of conflict resolution techniques.3 As Leonard Riskin has
explained, mediators at the extreme end of the evaluative spectrum
adopt strategies "intended to direct some or all of the outcomes of the
mediation."' At the other end of the continuum, highly facilitative me-
diators adopt strategies "intended simply to allow the parties to com-
municate with and understand one another."5 In discussing the differing
assumptions underlying the choice of an evaluative or facilitative
stance, Riskin notes:
The mediator who evaluates assumes that the participants want
and need her to provide some guidance as to the appropriate
grounds for settlement.... Conversely, the mediator who facili-
tates assumes that the parties are intelligent, able to work with
their counterparts, and capable of understanding their situations
better than the mediator and, perhaps, better than their lawyers.6
While the use of evaluation in mediation is common, and growing,7
this development has not been received with universal celebration. Ad-
vocates of a pure facilitative style maintain that evaluative mediation is
oxymoronic' In their view, the essence of mediation lies in encouraging
disputants' unfettered autonomy in the resolution of their dispute.9
probably not be so agitated by the proffered distinction. However, considerably more is at
stake.").
3. See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good
Mediation?" 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66-72 (1991) (identifying "trashing" and "bashing"
styles of mediation that are strongly evaluative, as well as the "hashing" mediative approach
which is highly facilitative).
4. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Tech-
niques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7,24 (1996).
5. Id-
6. Id.
7. See James H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Ques-
tions and Tentative Proposals, From an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769,
770-71 (1997) (arguing that evaluative mediation is both prevalent and likely here to stay).
8. See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Evaluative Mediation is an Oxymoron, in
14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 31 (1996).
9. See JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 35 (1984) ("Adjudicatory procedures ... are
too often used coercively to supplant self-determination with no evidence that the disputants
have been encouraged and helped to resolve their differences... Using mediation to facili-
tate conflict resolution and encourage self-determination thus strengthens democratic values
and enhances the dignity of those in conflict."); James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus Facilitative
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Further, they note that mediation aims toward the creation of needs-
based agreements.'0 The parties must trust the mediator in order to re-
veal the needs and interests underlying their stated position." This trust
can only be established if the mediator maintains strict neutrality. 2
Evaluation by the mediator, they maintain, vitiates this neutrality and
destroys the rapport necessary for truly productive interactions. 3
Proponents of evaluative mediation counter that disputants often
seek out the opinion of a neutral third party-that the mediator's opin-
ion often helps, rather than hinders, the construction of settlements. 4
Discussing how each disputant's position accords with existing social
and legal norms makes for more informed decision making, and, in the
long run, more equitable agreements. 5 Further, they note that much of
what goes by the name of mediation today involves some evaluative ac-
Mediation: A Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 919, 923 (1997) ("I think that [an evalua-
tive opinion] starts to infringe not only on the impartiality, but on the self-determination
provisions. You're suddenly exerting pressure designed.., to deter or prevent real honest
self-determination, and that verges on coercion.") (quoting Professor Robert Moberly);
Alison Taylor, Concepts of Neutrality in Family Mediation: Contexts, Ethics, Influence, and
Transformative Process, 14 MEDIATION Q. 215,221-22 (1997) (noting that mediators using a
normative-evaluative mode are directly influencing the behavior and agreements of the par-
ties and questioning whether those mediators are "violating the concept of client self-
determination.").
10. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754,759-60 (1984).
11. See NANCY H. ROGERS & RICHARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO
MEDIATION AND THE LAW 11 (1987) ("Mediators traditionally enter disputes with little
authority, so their ability to help bring about settlements.. .depends, in part, upon the will-
ingness of the parties to accept the mediator. Mediators typically gain this acceptance by
earning the parties' trust, a process that begins with the mediator's first interaction with the
disputants and continues until mediation is concluded.").
12. Kovach & Love, supra note 8, at 35; ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 11, at 11.
("Trust is attained and maintained when the mediator is perceived by the disputants as an
individual who understands and cares about the parties and their disputes ... treats them im-
partially.... and has no interests that conflict with helping to bring about a resolution which
is in the parties' best interest.") (emphasis added).
13. See Kovach & Love, supra note 8, at 31-32; ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 11, at 11;
see, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994); see also
Symposium, Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1995 J.
DIsP. RESOL. 95, 127.
14. See John Bickerman, Evaluative Mediator Responds, in 14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE
HIGH COST OF LITIG. 70, 70 (1996) ("parties often want-and expect-a mediator to explore
strengths and weaknesses of the case.... Without sacrificing neutrality, a mediator's neu-
tral assessment can provide participants with a much-needed reality check.").
15. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through
Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 75 (1996) (suggesting that justice in court-based mediation is best
achieved when parties make decisions based on an understanding of relevant law).
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tivity by the mediator.16 To construct a definition of mediation that ex-
cludes most of what the practitioner and lay communities understand to
be mediation would spawn needless confusion. 7
This essay does not seek to resolve the debate. Rather, it seeks to
"reframe" the issues by viewing them through the lens of therapeutic
jurisprudence. Mediation theory teaches that seemingly intractable is-
sues may be reconfigured in ways that permit a resolution.8 While the
frame of therapeutic jurisprudence may not end the evalua-
tive/facilitative debates, it may help illuminate some previously unex-
amined aspects of the controversy and point the way toward future
points of convergence.
II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law as a
"therapeutic agent." 9 It views
legal rules, legal procedures, and the roles of legal actors (such
as lawyers and judges) [as] social forces that... often produce
therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences. Therapeutic juris-
prudence calls for the study of these consequences ... in order to
identify them and to ascertain whether the law's antitherapeutic
effects can be reduced, and its therapeutic effects enhanced,
without subordinating due process and other justice values.,0
Therapeutic jurisprudence originated in the field of mental health
16. See, e.g., John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each
Other? 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 849-56 (1997) (describing mediator styles that include
evaluative activity and concluding that it is probably no longer possible to define mediation
in a way that excludes such styles).
17. See Riskin, supra note 4, at 13 (1996) ("It is too late for commentators or mediation
organizations to tell practitioners who are widely recognized as mediators that they are not,
in the same sense that it is too late for the Pizza Association of Naples, Italy to tell Domino's
that its product is not the genuine article. Such an effort would both cause acrimony and in-
crease.., confusion...").
18. See MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELE S.G. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION 87
(1996) ("The ability to reframe is a skill that is essential to the art of mediation. A reframe is
a response to a message being sent from one party to another that intends to redirect, limit,
or shape the perception of the message so that the message and its response become more
constructive.").
19. Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 645, 646 (David




law.2 Initial writings analyzed the psychological consequences of civil
commitment hearings,2 the effects of incompetency labeling, 2 and the
standards used to assess juveniles' competence to stand trial in a crimi-
nal matter. The scope of therapeutic jurisprudence however has ex-
panded beyond the core content areas of mental health law to include
sexual orientation, disability,' healthcare, contracts, and commercial
law. While earlier commentary urged the creation of laws that would
function therapeutically, more recent writings have considered how ex-
isting law might be interpreted and applied in a therapeutic manner.
For example, one recent article, applying a therapeutic jurisprudence
approach to the confidentiality provisions of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, suggests that employees who keep their disabilities confi-
dential will likely be perceived as odd or unfriendly, perceptions that
Will increase their social isolation and sense of alienation.29 Conse-
quently, the author recommends that disabled employees waive the
confidentiality protections of the Act and involve co-workers in the
process of designing reasonable accommodations for the workplace. 0
Another article takes up the question of whether a fault-based or no-
fault compensation system is more likely to restore the mental health of
an injured plaintiff and concludes that a fault-based system offers
greater potential for making the plaintiff emotionally whole.
Remarkably, no commentator, as yet, has focused the lens of thera-
21. See generally David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y & L. 220 (1995).
22. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures:
Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433 (1992).
23. See Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implications
for Mental Health Law, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 6 (1995).
24. See Richard Barnum & Thomas Grisso, Competence to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court
in Massachusetts: Issues of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON GRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 321 (1994).
25. See Kay Kavanagh, Don't Ask, Don't Tell- Deception Required, Disclosure Denied,
1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 142 (1995).
26. See Rose A. Daly-Mooney, Designing Reasonable Accommodations Through Co-
Worker Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Confidentiality Provisions of the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 8 J. L. & HEALTH 89 (1994).
27. See Bruce J. Winick, Rethinking the Health Care Delivery Crisis: The Need for a
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 7 J. L. & HEALTH 49 (1993).
28. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 445 (1994).
29. See Daly-Rooney, supra note 26, at 101.
30. See id. at 90-91.
31. See Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN.
L. REV. 39,77 (1992).
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peutic jurisprudence on the mediation field. This is surprising, given
that mediation could be described as conflict resolution in a "therapeu-
tic key. 3
2
III. MEDIATION: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY
The mediation movement, in large measure, represents a reaction
to the psychological brutality of the adversary system.33 Repelled by the
emotional toll litigation exacts from participants, mediators seek to
provide a less traumatic means of resolving conflict.' While some me-
diators hawk their wares by stressing time and costs savings,35 most also
see their role as generating solutions more creative and satisfying than a
court could award.36 Recognizing that disputants often emerge from a
court battle dissatisfied with both the process and the result, most me-
diators seek to focus disputants on the needs and interests underlying
their stated positions. This approach is designed to ensure that dispu-
32. The phrase "in a therapeutic key" is borrowed from David Wexler and Bruce
Winick's book LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 19.
33. See O.J. Coogler, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT 7, 24
(1978) ("Unfortunately the parties seldom visualize in advance how their situation could pos-
sibly turn into a bitter competitive struggle." ... "Difficult as it often is for them to talk to
each other, it is a wise decision when couples choose to work out their own settlement in-
stead of abdicating that power to others. Even though divorcing couples often feel helpless
and confused, all but the more severely dysfunctional can negotiate a settlement if a struc-
ture is provided within which to do so.").
34. Ann Milne, Mediation-A Promising Alternative for Family Courts, 42(2) Juv. FAM.
Cr. J. at 61, 63 (1991).
35. JAMES C. FREUND, THE NEUTRAL NEGOTIATOR: WHY AND How MEDIATION
CAN WORK TO RESOLVE DOLLAR DISPUTES 11(1994) (Describing evaluative mediation and
touting the time and costs savings the client will enjoy); Robert Fitzpatrick, The War in the
Workplace Must End, But Arbitration is Not the Answer, SC59 ALI-ABA 779, 786 (March
12, 1998) (describing mediation as "a cost effective and cost efficient method of resolving
disputes." ); Raymond L. Ocampo, Jr., Critical Path to Mediating High-Tech Disputes, Prac-
ticing Law Institute, 507 PLI/ PAT 1081, 1083 (February 1998) (explaining that mediation is
the alternative dispute resolution mechanism of choice in high-tech disputes because "the
short compressed business cycles (often referred to as 'Internet years') of intellectual prop-
erty products greatly increase the importance of prompt, cost-beneficial resolution of dis-
putes.")
36. Dana Wordes, The Art of Construction Mediation Practicing Law Institute, 425
PLI/REAL PROPERTY 137, 139, 143 (April 1998) (stating initially that "[i]nformality, civility,
privacy, speed, and cost" are the key to mediation's appeal, but later noting, "[t]he greater
potential for direct client involvement, as compared to litigation or arbitration, makes it
more likely that the parties will adopt a business or technical, as opposed to a legal solu-
tion"); Ocampo, supra note 35, at 1083 (quoting mediation professional Cathy Yanni, "With
the help of the mediator, the parties in mediation strive to find common interests to allow
them to resolve their dispute.").
37. Wordes, supra note 36 at 143; Ocampo, supra note 35, at 1083.
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tants emerge from their dispute feeling that they received what they
needed, rather than a third party's assessment of what was required.38
Additionally, mediation relies heavily on social science inquiries
into the psychology of procedural justice, a body of work which has
been extremely influential in the therapeutic jurisprudence literature.
This work suggests that people are more satisfied and comply more
fully with the outcome of legal proceedings when they perceive those
proceedings to be fair and have an opportunity to participate in them?9
Research reveals that three elements-participation, dignity and
trust-play a large role in people's assessment of procedural fairness.
Foundational studies in the therapeutic jurisprudence literature demon-
strate that disputants perceive a judicial process as fair when they can
present evidence, voice their own views and/or share in the decision-
making process.4" Presenting evidence and one's own view appears to
favorably affect perceptions of fairness, even when it is clear such pres-
entations will not influence the outcome of the proceedings. 4 The de-
gree to which a disputant is treated with respect and dignity also influ-
ences perceptions of procedural fairness.42 Finally, studies reveal that
people feel as if they are treated fairly when they trust that the authori-
ties with whom they are dealing are concerned about their welfare and
want to treat them fairly.43
The mediation process is structured to provide enhanced disputant
participation and dignity and to foster trust between the mediator and
disputants. The mediation process includes an introductory stage in
which the mediator strives to secure the trust of the disputants. Ex-
plaining the mediator's role as a neutral, maintaining informality, and
explaining the chronology of the process are all ways the mediator
38. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR", 19 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991) (arguing that
"the limited remedial imagination of courts ... restricts what possible solutions the parties
could develop" and that "alternative forms of dispute resolution, or new conceptualizations
of old processes, could lead to outcomes that were efficient in the Pareto-optimal sense of
making both parties better off without worsening the position of the other.").
39. See John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541
(1978).
40. E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Non-
instrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952,
952-59 (1990).
41. See id.
42. E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their
Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & SOC'Y REV. 953, 968-71 (1990).
43. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Rational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115,137-66 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992).
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works to gain the disputants' confidence and faith." The mediator calls
upon each disputant to describe the dispute from his or her own per-
spective." If there are attorneys present, they are often advised to take
a back seat to their clients.4 Disputants are further encouraged to work
together to develop options for resolution. While it is permissible for
mediators to offer suggestions, ideally the mediator encourages the par-
ties to generate the options themselves.4 Further, one common ground
rule in mediation is that all participants will treat one another with re-
spect throughout the process, thus ensuring that, at least during the con-
fines of the mediation, individuals feel protected and respected.49
While some mediators and mediation organizations de-emphasize
mediation's psychic benefits for clients, advertising, instead, its cost-
effectiveness and efficiency, ° these providers remain in the minority.
44. See BENNETT & HERMANN, supra note 18, at 35-40 (explaining that the mediator
outlines the structure, rules and goals of mediation to the parties in the initial "contracting
stage" and that this stage represents the mediator's "first opportunity to gain credibility with
and trust from the parties.").
45. See ROGERS & SALEM, supra note 11, at 22.
46. See BENNETT & HERMANN, supra note 18, at 13-14 (portraying mediation as a pro-
cess where lawyers have little or no involvement). But see John Lande, How Will Lawyering
and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other? 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 843-44 (1997)
(observing that lawyer participation in mediation differs dramatically depending on locale.
In some areas, lawyers are intimately involved, while in others they are precluded from at-
tendance.); DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES
FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS 66 (1996) ("If the parties are represented by counsel, the
attorneys will almost always make the opening statements. This usually produces the most
effective and efficient presentations. At times, however, it is more effective to encourage the
lawyers to outline the case, then let a key participant speak directly."). See also John Lande,
Lawyers' Routine Participation Directs Shape of 'Liti-Mediation' in 16 ALTERNATIVES TO
THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 53 (April 1998) (discussing risks and benefits associated with law-
yers' increasing participation in mediation).
47. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 49-51 (describing the goal of the third
stage of mediation as helping the participants articulate the options they know or want, as
well as develop new options).
48. See BENNETT & HERMANN, supra note 18, at 56-57 (listing mediator tasks during
option-generation stage as staying out of the parties' way and "remember[ing] that it is the
parties' ultimate responsibility to resolve their conflict"; GOLANN, supra note 46, at 263
(suggesting that offering a proposal should not be the mediator's first response to impasse
because it discourages the parties from being creative); FOLBERG & TAYLOR supra note 9,
at 51 (cautioning that" a mediator who is offering too many new options too fast will inhibit
the participants' own expression and views.").
49. See San Diego Mediation Center Introductory Mediation Skills Training Manual 28
(1996) (on file with author).
50. See Robert Fitzpatrick, Non-Binding Mediation of Employment Disputes: An ADR
Method That is Consistent With the American Promise of Fairness, American Law Institute-
American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education, SC59 ALI-ABA 791, (Mar. 12,
1998) ( describing a mediation process that does not involve the exploration of party needs
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To the extent that mediation as a field continues to encourage disputant
voice, participation, respect and dignity, mediation may be described as
conflict resolution in a "therapeutic key. 52 By focusing on disputant
needs and fostering procedural justice, mediation seeks to deliver
agreements that better meet disputant needs through a process that is
itself designed to enhance disputant mental health.53
IV. THE EVALUATIVE/FACILITATIVE DEBATE
If we assume that most theorists and practitioners conceive of me-
diation as an effort to approach conflict resolution in a "therapeutic
key," then we may frame the evaluative/facilitative debate as a dis-
agreement over which mediation style will have the greatest therapeutic
and interests, and highlighting its cost savings for the client).
51. Even mediators of the most utilitarian bent conceive of mediation as offering the
potential for more humane disputing. See id. at 623 (noting that mediation is confidential
and consistent with the American ideal of fair play).
52. See supra note 32.
53. See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine:
An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 256-257 (1981); ("[P]eople whose cases were
mediated expressed higher levels of satisfaction 'with their overall experience in media-
tion/court' than those whose cases were adjudicated: 66.6% of the former group indicated
they were completely or mostly satisfied compared to 54% of the latter."); Robert E. Emery
& Joanne A. Jackson, The Charlottesville Mediation Project" Mediated and Litigated Child
Custody Disputes, MEDIATION Q., (Summer 1989), at 11-12 ("Mediation clearly led to
greater satisfaction in a large number of areas, including issues where adversary settlement
would be expected to be superior (for example, feeling that one's rights were protected.").
However, some data casts doubt on the assumption that disputants necessarily experience
mediation to be fairer and more satisfying than more formal judicial procedures. See Lind,
supra note 42, at 953-80. In a three site study, researchers explored disputant reaction to
traditional civil trials, court annexed arbitration, and judicial settlement conferences by com-
paring reactions to each procedure with reactions to bilateral settlement. Disputants were
asked to rate both the procedural fairness of the process they experienced, as well as their
satisfaction with the outcome attained. The disputants who pursued resolution through trial
or arbitration reported higher procedural fairness ratings than those who settled. These
higher ratings reflect the disputant's perceptions that trials and arbitration procedures are
more dignified and more carefully orchestrated than bilateral settlements. They further re-
flect the litigants' sense that they understood the litigation process and felt they participated
more than did disputants in bilateral settlements. Neither cost, nor delay, nor case outcome
appeared to correlate with procedural justice judgments. By contrast, disputant procedural
fairness ratings for judicial settlement conferences were lower than those for bilateral set-
tlement, though the difference was not statistically significant. Significantly, disputants rou-
tinely attended the trial and arbitration sessions, but were excluded from settlement confer-
ences. This data confirms the insight that disputants' quest for procedural justice is best
satisfied when they participate in a dignified dispute resolution process that gives them a
sense of control and involvement. The data further suggests that adjudicatory processes
might serve those functions better than previously believed. See iL at 980-86.
1998]
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effect.54 Arguably, proponents of a purely facilitative mediation style
emphasize the emotional benefits associated with autonomous decision-
making,55 while ignoring other possible emotional effects that might oc-
cur during and following the conclusion of the mediation. Supporters of
evaluative mediation take a wide angle view of the emotional repercus-
sions of mediation, considering the stress associated with making deci-
sions in an informational vacuum and the possible "buyer's remorse"
that may result. 6
When facilitative mediators defend their mediation methodology,
they stress the benefits to disputants in making their own decisions, free
of coercive influences.57 They stress the confidence and feelings of well-
being engendered when people solve their own problems during media-
tion, and note that such feelings of empowerment may allow people to
better cope with other conflictual situations that arise. 8 They suggest
that a mediator possesses a great deal of power simply by virtue of her
position as mediator and that any expression of opinion will prove very
influential in the party's negotiations, thus curtailing party autonomy. 9
If a mediator brings legal or social norms into the discussion, it is ar-
gued, these norms will assume a predominant role in the discussion.
54. David Wexler, one of the architects of therapeutic jurisprudence, notes that the the-
ory leaves the concept of what is "therapeutic" intentionally vague, thereby allowing scholars
"to roam within the intuitive and common sense contours of the concept." Wexler, supra
note 21, at 221.
55. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 13.
56. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 15, at 86 ("If my opponent sues me for one thousand
dollars and I settle in mediation by paying him one hundred dollars, I might be personally
quite satisfied. If I learned afterward, however, that my opponent's claim is time barred, I
might feel otherwise about the result.").
57. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and
Recognition? The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253,
267-268 (1989); BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 13; Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why
Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 938-39, 944-49 (1997) (arguing
that mediators facilitate evaluation by the parties, and that "mediator evaluation detracts
from the focus on party-responsibility for.., creative problem-solving." Id- at 944.).
58. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 13, at 28-32; Love, supra note 57, at 944-45 ("If we
allow mediation and mediators to slip into the comfortable (because it is the norm) adver-
sarial mind-set of evaluation, we kill the turbo-thrust of the jet engine of idea generation.").
59. See James Alfini, supra note 9, at 930 (presenting explanation provided by Donna
Gebhart for why she won't put a dollar value on cases: "I believe very strongly that when, or
if, I evaluate the case, because they generally value what I say, it will affect their decision.
They may be settling for something that they wouldn't really be happy with."); Love, supra
note 57 at 942-43, 945-46 (arguing that a mediator's evaluation "carries enormous weight"
and may effectively "shut down" the negotiations); John Lande, supra note 16, at 874 ("Some
advocates of empowerment argue that mediators should not express opinions about the sub-




The conversational focus will shift from the parties' own values and
definitions of fairness to consideration of the norms inscribed in judicial
decisions, statutes, and the literature of relevant professional disci-
plines."0 Decisions reached will conform, to a greater or lesser degree,
with these external norms, but the parties' sense that they are crafting
agreements that correspond with their own notions of equity will be
lost. When mediators evaluate the parties' situation, critics maintain,
the parties will feel railroaded and dispossessed, not empowered. 2
Additionally, these critics note that mediator evaluation serves a
useful purpose only if one defines the goal of mediation to be settle-
ment." Another, and for many, more important process goal, is ex-
panding the consciousness of the disputants.' Mediation may enable
people to become more aware of their own needs, while simultaneously
attaining a better grasp and appreciation of the needs of others.6 Me-
diation can only effect these therapeutic transformations by centering
negotiations on the parties' interests, and encouraging open, forthright,
and often intimate disclosure. Reorienting discussion to the mediator's
perspective of the parties' dispute limits the possibilities for true self-
knowledge or empathy with the other.6 The dispute may settle, but the
potential for personal empowerment, transformation, and healing will
be lost.67
Those who endorse evaluative mediation take a different tack.
60. See Kovach & Love, supra note 8, at 31-32; Stulberg, supra note 2, at 988 (summa-
rizing arguments that evaluative mediation undermines the parties' "understanding of one
another's situation" and ability to "develop concrete resolutions of their [own] tangible con-
cerns").
61. Stulberg, supra note 2, at 1002 ("Bargaining-negotiating-and mediated negotia-
tions require conversation, dialogue, and interaction with perceived opponents. The proc-
esses require extending a fundamental respect to one's counterpart in order to create the
possibility for striking a deal. Evaluative mediation distorts those values and behaviors and
effectively denies their possibilities.").
62. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
LJ. 1545, 1549 (1991) (arguing that mediators often impose their own biases and prejudices
on the parties, leading the parties to feel coerced in the process).
63. See Stulberg, supra note 2, at 991(arguing that evaluative mediation can only be as-
sessed in terms of the efficiency with which the parties reach settlement).
64. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 13, at 81-112; see also Kovach & Love, supra note
8, at 32. ("Such approaches [predicting unfavorable litigation outcomes] settle cases, but
they are not consonant with mediation's primary goals of enhancing understanding between
parties and encouraging parties to create outcomes that respond to underlying interests.").
65. See Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325
(1971).




While they also support autonomous decision making, they contend
that one cannot make a truly autonomous decision without knowledge
of relevant legal and social norms.6 Additionally, they maintain that
disputants who bind themselves to agreements in ignorance of prevail-
ing social norms will not experience the mediation process as therapeu-
tic. 69 They will be wary and uncertain about their decisions. Further, it
is likely that disputants will receive information about how the conflict
would have been resolved in a courtroom. If one disputant settles in
mediation for a result less favorable than the one she would have re-
ceived in court, she will likely suffer "buyer's remorse."7 Far from
feeling empowered and enlightened, they will feel exploited and under-
cut. Advocates of evaluative mediation also argue that dispute closure
has therapeutic effects and thus, to the degree that evaluative mediation
helps bring about settlement, it is therapeutic, even if the parties are not
the sole captains of the process.7' Thus, evaluative mediators claim their
methodology is more therapeutic than the pure facilitative model be-
68. See James H. Stark, Preliminary Reflections on the Establishment of a Mediation
Clinic, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 457, 487 (1996); Lela Porter Love, Mediation: The Romantic
Days Continue, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 735, 738-39 (1997) (describing consensus among many
mediation scholars and practitioners that "the notion of self-determination includes the value
of informed decision-making").
69. See Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage" Through Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1687, 1694-95, 1742 (1997) (arguing that a purely facilitative mediation model that ig-
nores community norms (what the author terms a "private-ordering understanding" of me-
diation) may "neglect the many ways in which individuals may want to know how various
communities they respect might understand their disputes... [M]ediation may only expose
individuals to a relatively cramped set of values that might inform how they order their
lives.").
70. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The Need for
Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949, 972-
73 (1997) (arguing in favor of evaluation in court-sponsored mediation because parties in
these programs will assume that "whatever occurs under the auspices of the mediation is
within the range of outcomes that would result from litigation. If the mediator permits the
parties to reach settlements that fall outside this admittedly broad range of 'adjudication de-
fault probabilities,' at least one of the parties may pay a heavy price for the mediator's as-
siduously facilitative approach.").
71. See GOLANN, supra note 46, at 270 (arguing that "responsible use of evaluation is
consistent with the goals of mediation to assist parties in reaching a negotiated agreement
that is better for them than their alternatives."); see also Deborah M. Kolb & Kenneth Kres-
sel, The Realities of Making Talk Work, in WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS,
470-74 (Deborah Kolb & Assoc., eds. 1994) (noting that some mediators adopt a directive
evaluative style because they believe they can best benefit the parties by helping them
achieve settlement.); John Lande, Stop Bickering! A Call for Collaboration, in 16
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 1, 12 (1998) ("Some mediators believe that
disputants are primarily interested in ending their disputes, and thus settlement is the only or
primary goal of mediation.").
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cause it provides disputants with enough information to make decisions
confidently in mediation and to avoid subsequent feelings of loss or dis-
appointment.?
V. CONCLUSION
Though mediation could be described as conflict resolution in a
"therapeutic key," to date, the mediation community has made little use
of therapeutic jurisprudence. This essay seeks to remedy this oversight
by applying the insights of therapeutic jurisprudence to the current de-
bate over the use of evaluation in mediation. Assuming that both the
evaluative and pure facilitative schools envision mediation to be a
therapeutic process3 , this paper argues that the debate stems from each
schools' differing judgment of which mediation techniques and inter-
ventions have the greatest therapeutic effect on disputants. Put another
way, the two schools differ in their understanding of what disputants
experience as therapeutic when they are in conflict. Facilitative media-
tors emphasize the healing aspects of autonomous decision making and
maintain that a process which considers only party norms and values
will yield the greatest therapeutic effect.74 Evaluative mediators also
72. It is important to note that many mediators and theorists support evaluative media-
tion because they believe that evaluative mediation generates fairer, more equitable agree-
ments, and thus is more "therapeutic" for society generally. Based on the assumption that
social and legal norms embody principles important to the health of the body politic, these
theorists support the creation of private agreements that are informed and, to some degree,
constrained by these social norms. See, e.g., Robert P. Schuwerk, Reflections on Ethics and
Mediation, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 757, 764 (arguing that mediators should not allow the creation
of a "clearly unjust" agreement). See also Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social
Norms in Mediation" A Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 742-53 (1997) (de-
scribing practice of norm-advocating mediation in which mediators inform disputants of ex-
isting social and legal norms and advocate for the inclusion in the resulting agreement).
73. As noted, there are some mediators who downplay the therapeutic aspects of me-
diation, highlighting instead the opportunity to take a cheap and quick "short cut" to resolu-
tion. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Most mediators, however, are committed to
providing disputants a litigation alternative that is less expensive psychically, as well as fi-
nancially.
74. Facilitative mediators may encourage parties to obtain information about relevant
social or legal norms from another source, but will avoid providing the information them-
selves. If, however, the parties choose not to obtain information from an outside counselor,
the mediator refrains from providing the information, leaving the parties to bargain in a
normative vacuum. See Kimberlee Kovach & Lela Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of
Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 71, 79 n. 175 and accompanying text (1998).
See also Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms in Divorce Mediation: An Argument for
Inclusion, 1 VA. J. OF SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 101-07, 134-41 (1993) (arguing that family media-
tion model that precludes mediator discussion of legal norms often results in disputants de-
termining post-divorce arrangements in ignorance of legal principles and guidelines)
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value autonomous decision making, but maintain that such decision
making will be more empowering and satisfying if it is informed by
relevant social norms.75 Additionally, these mediators point to the
healing effect of reaching resolution and hold that evaluative mediation,
if it enhances the likelihood of settlement, is more healing for that
quality alone.
While the mediation community continues to debate which form of
mediation is purest and most therapeutic, few efforts have been made to
survey disputants themselves on the question." While numerous studies
exist documenting the higher levels of satisfaction experienced by dis-
75. Those who recognize facilitative mediation as the only "true" form of mediation
tend to assume that mediator evaluation necessarily entails mediator coercion and pressure.
See Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediator For?": Mediation's "Value-
Added"for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 35 (1996) ("evaluation can easily
turn into direction and pressure, and there is considerable evidence that, in practice, it often
does."); Kovach & Love, supra note 74, at 80, 100 ("Evaluative behavior 'may usurp the par-
ties' role as evaluators of their own alternatives to negotiation.... ."' If mediator evaluation
were entirely non-coercive and did not detract from party participation or decision-making,
then arguably evaluative mediation would not conflict with party self-determination. How-
ever many ADR processes depend on the potency and impact of neutral evaluation for their
efficacy, evidence of the power of evaluation.") By contrast, those who endorse evaluative
mediation define it as a mediative approach which gives the parties more information with
which to structure superior agreements. This vision of evaluative mediation does not include
coercive or pressure tactics. See Stempel, supra note 70, at 982 ("more value is added to the
process when the mediator not only gives the parties a forum and assists them in new ways of
assessing the dispute, but also provides some yardstick for assessing the options and some
information about the range of default options if the matter is adjudicated rather than set-
tled.")
76. Robert A. Baruch Bush has argued, based on mediation evaluation and "procedural
justice" studies, that mediation disputants value the degree and quality of participation, ex-
pression and communication afforded dispute resolution procedures as much, or more, than
the substantive outcome reached. Bush, supra note 75, at 35. However, the mediation
evaluation studies compare mediation disputant satisfaction with the satisfaction of dispu-
tants who pursued resolution through litigation. These studies merely indicate that dispu-
tants in mediation prefer the level of participation and control they enjoy in mediation to the
much-diminished levels they experience in court procedures. Additionally, while the proce-
dural justice studies indicate that disputants value the ability to express their views, even
where it is clear that such expression will not affect the substantive outcome. See Bush, supra
note 75, at 19, n.19, they also reveal that disputants value the ability to voice their views to a
greater degree when they believe such expression will favorably affect the substantive out-
come. Lind, supra note 42, at 952-57. Thus, these studies support the conclusion that dispu-
tants value the ability to participate in dispute resolution procedures both for symbolic non-
instrumental reasons, and because they think their input will be instrumentally useful in
producing a more favorable outcome. This insight validates the use of an evaluative media-
tion style that allows disputants free rein to express themselves, but also provides informa-
tion that helps disputants locate their negotiations within a mutually acceptable normative
framework.
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putants who mediated, as opposed to litigated, their conflicts,' no study
to date has examined disputant satisfaction when participating in an
evaluative mediation, as opposed to a facilitative mediation." Moreo-
ver, while early studies assessed the mental health functioning of media-
tion disputants post-mediation versus litigants post-trial 9 no study to
date has systematically examined the mental health functioning of those
who have experienced evaluative versus facilitative mediation.
Mediators and mediation scholars have always had a therapeutic fo-
cus. Questions of how conflict might be transmuted into an opportunity
for growth, renewal and healing have long been at the core of many
mediators' practice. And, in debating that point, scholars continue to
make assumptions about what disputants experience as therapeutic. It
is time to construct a research agenda that includes systematic examina-
tion of mediation procedures that are both evaluative and facilitative.
Partisans on both sides of the debate should eschew speculation and
work to develop a concrete knowledge base about the effects of evalua-
tive and facilitative techniques on disputant satisfaction. It is time to
stop speaking for disputants and allow them to speak for themselves.
As the mediation field wrestles with divergent visions of mediation's
goal and method, it is important to attend to its own rhetoric of dispu-
tant autonomy and control. Only by listening to what disputants them-
77. Jessica Pearson and Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: Reflections on a Decade
of Research in Mediation Research; The Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party Interven-
tion 19 (Kenneth Kressel and Dean G. Pruitt and Assoc., eds. 1989) (More than three-fourths
of the disputants who mediated their custody dispute expressed extreme satisfaction with the
process, while the percentage of litigants who were satisfied with the court process ranged
from 30-40 percent.); Joan B. Kelly, Mediated and Adversarial Divorce: Respondents' Per-
ception of their Processes and Outcomes, MEDIATION Q., (Summer 1989) at 71, 85-86 (com-
paring perceptions of 212 mediation and 225 adversarial respondents to their divorce process
and outcome and concluding that "[o]n no single item measuring process or outcome did ad-
versarial women express more satisfaction or more favorable perception of their attorneys,
their divorce process, or their agreements").
78. Existing data reveals that attorneys representing clients in mediation expect media-
tors to assess the strength and weaknesses of their client's case and offer a proposed settle-
ment range. See Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the
Lawyer's Philosophical Map? 18 HAMLINE J. OF PUB. L. AND POL'Y 376, 384 (1997); David
B. Keller, Negotiatory Alchemy: The Court Special Master as Scientist and Mediator, 13
NEGOTIATION J. 389, 395 (1997) ("Generally, I found that the more evaluative and narrow I
become, the more receptive were the attorneys, since this played more to a position-based
distributive bargaining theme common to settlement conferences with judges (an extreme
evaluative narrow approach)").
79. See Robert Emery et al., Child Custody Mediation & Litigation: Further Evidence on the
Differing Views of Mothers and Fathers, 59 J. CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 410,411
(1991).
1998]
170 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:155
selves have to say about mediator approach and technique can we
fashion effective and sensible policies regarding the role of evaluation
in mediation.
